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Abstract
This study seeks to identify institutional characteristics of financially sustainable welfare 
states that focus on tax structure. Using data collected from 17 OECD countries from 1986 
to 2013, this study investigates the characteristics of fiscal sustainability of each welfare 
state. The model of simultaneous equations (three-step least-squares method) is used 
for treating simultaneousness between fiscal sustainability and welfare expenditures. As 
a result, increasing the level of tax burden generally has a positive effect on the fiscal 
sustainability of the welfare state. However, the most important point that should be con-
sidered is the manner of raising tax revenue that affects the sustainability of economic, 
political, and social dimensions for securing fiscal sustainability. Specifically, it is neces-
sary to raise the equity between the sources of taxation in accordance with the ability 
to pay principle. Improving vertical equity can also make a positive contribution to the 
fiscal sustainability in order to secure the political legitimacy of the tax and mitigate the 
regressive burden, which may result from the expansion of a consumption tax. Finally, 
it is beneficial to fiscal sustainability of the welfare state to diversify the financial base by 
combining the ability to pay principle and the benefit principle.
Keywords: fiscal sustainability, welfare state, taxation, tax equity, comparative studies
1. Introduction
his chapter begins with the question of the claim that all welfare states face financial difficul-
ties. In other words, it stems from the question: “Are there no strategies to ensure the fiscal 
sustainability of the welfare state while maintaining the appropriate level of welfare spend-
ing?” Early neo-Marxists predicted that the fiscal crisis of the welfare state was unavoidable 
1This paper is adapted from the author’s doctoral dissertation (in Korean).
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due to contradictions in the capitalist mode of production, which caused the conflict of accu-
mulation and justification [1, 2]. Streeck [3] also recently argued that the 2008 global financial 
crisis was an inevitable consequence of an unstable combination of capitalism and democracy 
in capitalist countries. His argument is that the financial crisis is the result of the demolition 
of democratic capitalism because of capital beyond democratic control in the process of post-
capitalist transition to neoliberalism in the development and reinterpretation of new Marxist 
claims in the present situation.
However, it is difficult to accept these claims when we remember that the recent financial 
crisis has not appeared in all advanced western welfare states. In particular, it is not easy to 
assert that the fiscal crisis of the welfare state is inevitable, considering that it is not found in 
the Nordic countries, which provide generous welfare benefits, but it is found in Southern 
Europe, where the level of welfare spending is low and the social security system is not suf-
ficiently developed when compared to other western welfare states. Therefore, it is necessary 
to identify what kind of welfare state is fiscally sustainable, as well as the difference between 
fiscally sustainable countries and nonsustainable countries.
In fact, if the government has sufficient fiscal space and the state is able to cope with increasing 
debt without damaging fiscal sustainability [4] for welfare expenditures, the problem of fiscal 
sustainability will not rise seriously. The methods of securing financial resources include the 
expansion of taxes or nontax receipts, the reduction of public expenditures, the adjustment 
of expenditure priorities, and increase in expenditure efficiency, currency issuance, and for-
eign aid [5]. One of the key strategies that advanced welfare states can implement to mitigate 
financial tensions is to increase tax revenues or reduce welfare spending on major public 
expenditures. Often in high-income countries, cuts in spending are considered to be superior 
to revenue increases [6]. It is argued that adjustments through a reduction in public spending 
are less likely to lead to a recession than tax expansion and may also have a positive impact 
on growth. According to this assertion, the best way to ensure the fiscal sustainability of a 
welfare state is to reduce welfare expenditures.
Although, reducing welfare spending is not the only answer to the financial crisis facing the 
welfare state, because cutting public spending is not always possible and feasible. Alesiana 
and Giavazzi [6] point out that public spending reduction strategies that are accompanied by 
appropriate monetary policy play an important role in sound financing, but this is not always 
possible. As noted, EU countries have limited monetary policies at a single national level 
[7]. In addition, the sudden reduction of welfare benefits often leads to opposition from the 
people in the form of restrictions to the government’s response to the need for welfare due 
to new social risks, as well as political resistance from citizens who enjoyed existing welfare 
benefits [8, 9]. Of course, spending rebalancing and rationalization can be a useful means of 
securing financial resources within a given budget in the short term. However, as time goes 
by, marginal returns of spending rebalancing and rationalization are inevitably reduced, and 
as a result, these are not a fundamental alternative [5].
Therefore, we should focus on resource mobilization in order to secure predictable and sustain-
able financing [5]. This study focuses on the tax system, which is the main resource for advanced 
welfare countries among various resource mobilization methods. First, taxation plays an impor-
tant role in ensuring national policy capacity [10]. It can also lead or inhibit capital accumulation, 
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which is the tax base of welfare states, by changing individual and corporate investments, sav-
ings, and work behaviors [11]. In addition, since taxation acts as a key factor that regulates the 
members of the political community and forms a reciprocal obligatory relationship between 
them, how taxation is formed is closely related to political and social sustainability [12].
In Section 2, which follows, existing research on the determinants of the fiscal sustainability 
of the welfare state is examined in order to discuss limitations of this research and explain the 
approach of this study, which strives to address the limitations of existing research. Section 
3 identifies the research methods adopted in this study. Section 4 describes the results of the 
analysis, and Section 5 discusses the implications of this study.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Existing research on determinants of fiscal sustainability
Research on the financial issues of the welfare state is a classic theme of the welfare state. This is 
divided into studies focusing on economic factors and studies focusing on institutional factors.
2.1.1. Economic factors
Macroeconomic factors related to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state include eco-
nomic growth rates and interest rates, the gap between economic growth rates and interest 
rates, economic openness and financial market accessibility, and inflation.
At first, the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state is related to the economic growth [13–16]. 
If the economy grows smoothly, the tax is easily collected. In particular, progressive tax can 
be applied at a higher rate depending on the increase in income, so that tax rate growth 
is higher than the economic growth rate. In addition, inflation that accompanies economic 
growth can lead to a substantial decline in debt value, because debt is a nominal asset, and its 
value is fixed and transferred to the future. In the low growth phase, however, tax revenue 
was limited, and real debt burdens were likely to increase. In addition, due to the decrease in 
income, the debt burden was sure to increase.
The effects of interest rates on national debt have also been important [13, 16]. In the context of 
the emphasis on interest rates, some studies have focused on the initial level of debt [17, 18]. 
This is because countries with high initial debt have high interest rates on national debt, and 
their fiscal capacity is sensitive to changes in interest rates [19]. Therefore, there is a greater 
risk that fiscal sustainability will be weaker than that found in countries with low debt level.
Meanwhile, some studies have demonstrated that primary balance is important [14, 20]. 
Sakuragawa and Karou [14] examined the phenomenon that the real interest rate on government 
bonds is low, while the national debt surge is comparable to the gross domestic product in devel-
oped countries as well as Japan by incorporating the concept of intermediation cost is explained. 
Specifically, government bonds are not very sensitive to interest rate changes because intermedi-
ation costs lower deposit interest rates and bond return replaces deposits. Therefore, they argued 
the interest rate was not the primary factor, but, rather, the level of the primary balance.
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Some have paid attention to access to markets where the government can borrow money 
[21–24]. Drelichman and Voth [23] attempted to account for the fact that eighteenth-century 
England, whose financial position was worse than Spain’s in the sixteenth century, did not 
face insolvency. Specifically, England was able to borrow at a lower rate of interest than the 
market interest rate through financial repression, so the cost of interest was low. Thus, the 
interest burden on repayment of government bonds could be significantly reduced. Moreover, 
with financial globalization, the government took notice not only of the domestic market, but 
also the foreign market. In particular, low-income countries with low financial capacity can 
reduce the burden of foreign debt by improving access to financial markets due to globaliza-
tion [13, 22, 24], while developed countries do not have a statistically significant impact of the 
global capital market on fiscal sustainability [24].
In the past, inflation was the main variable of fiscal soundness [25]. Because the national debt 
is a nominal asset, a slight rise in prices alone can significantly lower the real value of govern-
ment bonds. However, recently developed countries have guaranteed the independence of 
the Central Bank in order to prevent inflation risks arising from the arbitrary use of monetary 
policy. Thus, the importance of monetary policy and inflationary taxation on fiscal soundness 
has weakened [26]. Especially in the case of European Union countries, it is argued that mon-
etary policy cannot be utilized in accordance with the reality of each country, and thus, it is 
further argued that there is a limit to the guarantee of financial stability [13, 26].
As confidence in monetary policy weakened following, the influence of fiscal policy began to 
be emphasized [26]. The most important variable is the aging population. Aging of the popu-
lation leads to a reduction in the number of workers who can contribute to public finance, 
an increase in the burden of care, and an increase in welfare spending for the elderly. This 
may in turn increase the financial burden of the government and undermine financial stabil-
ity. However, government spending does positively affect the sustainability of national debt, 
depending on the sector or the form of expenditures [20, 27]. In terms of financial revenues, 
Kaplanoglou and Rapanos [27] demonstrate that increasing the progressive tax burden may 
contribute to fiscal sustainability.
2.1.2. Institutional factors
Institutional factors identified in the empirical study are divided into two areas: political sys-
tems and financial systems. The former is a form of political decision-making [28], such as 
the electoral system or the political decision-making, and the latter implies a condition that 
restricts the adoption of fiscal policy [28].
The influence of elections has been considered important in relation to political institutions 
[29–35]. Theoretically, as politicians have incentive to increase the likelihood their reelection 
by using more public spending and debt accumulation. In addition, this may cause financial 
instability when financial status is arbitrarily adjusted in a strategic act to hinder the ability of 
the next elected candidate to enact policy. The empirical research also examines the relationship 
between political change and national debt accumulation, but the results are not constant 
[36, 37]. Some authors point out that these inconstant results are related to the lack of control 
over the nature of political systems in each country [38], because the structure of decision-
making changes the incentives of politicians [39].
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At first, decentralization has become a major concern in terms of the decision-making structure 
of fiscal policy. When there are a large number of participants in the decision-making process, 
each participant may represent only a narrow range of interest groups. Therefore, it may not 
be easy to reach consensus due to conflicting interests among participants. Indeed, if there is a 
structured coalition government or a strong bipartisan system, fiscal soundness is likely to be 
undermined [40]. In addition, there are slight differences in operational definitions, but gener-
ally, it is argued that the higher the number of expenditure departments or the larger the size 
of the Cabinet, the lower the financial performance [41–44]. In addition, there is a tendency for 
expansion of deficit and debt when there are a large number of effective political parties in the 
coalition or there is a small share of the ruling party in Parliament [43, 45].
The ideological composition of the Cabinet was also affected. The greater the proportion of 
politicians supporting a left-wing ideology in the Cabinet, the greater the likelihood that 
the state’s fiscal soundness will deteriorate [43]. Traditionally, politicians who support a 
leftist ideology are relatively supportive of public spending, particularly welfare spending, 
and have a tolerance for fiscal deficit [46, 47]. However, it is difficult to say with certainty 
that finances are unstable in the tradition of a representative system. This is consistent with 
Schmidt [48], who contended that the political composition or ideological differences of a gov-
ernment should not only lead to differences in financial performance, but that the political and 
economic conditions of each country should also be taken into account. In countries where a 
social democratic ideology is dominant within the Cabinet, social security spending is gener-
ally high, but the level of welfare spending and debt accumulation in these countries has not 
been high since mid-1970s [48]. While the left wing is generally favorable to a high tax burden 
and increased public spending, it is also true that differences in the composition of financial 
and tax systems have played a more important role than ideology in actual history [10].
As mentioned above, the influence of political formulations is limited, and studies focusing on 
financial systems have recently expanded. Since 1970s, OECD countries have pursued a series 
of reforms to effectively manage government spending growth and overcome fiscal deficits 
[49, 50]. In addition, it is necessary to establish a budget system for total budget allocations. In recent 
empirical studies, the introduction of a top-down budgeting system has had a positive effect on 
fiscal soundness [27]. In addition, the introduction of explicit fiscal rules has proved effective [51].
The introduction of a fiscal system that controls public expenditures and revenue levels is 
effective in promoting fiscal soundness, but caution is needed in interpreting it. First, the 
effectiveness of the fiscal system affects final fiscal performance in combination with the attri-
butes of the political system in each country [52]. Indeed, Hallerberg et al. [32, 33] formu-
late a centralization index and a rule index for the political system and fiscal policy decision 
structures to determine their impact on the rate of change in national debt. According to their 
results, strong fiscal rules in a representative council system and a concentration of decision-
making power over fiscal policy decisions in a majoritarian system or among mixed-govern-
ment countries have a statistically significant effect on reducing the national debt ratio.
2.2. Limitations of existing studies and approaches of this study
There are two limitations in the existing research in identifying the determinants of fiscal sus-
tainability of the welfare state. These are further divided into two dimensions: the measure-
ment of dependent variables and the composition of independent variables.
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2.2.1. Measuring the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state
In the previous study, the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state has been replaced by the 
level of the primary balance or the national debt level. However, the financial condition of 
the state cannot be exclusively evaluated using either values, because it means that even if 
deficit occurs, state can recover fiscal balance without default [53–55]. Moreover, the financial 
problems of the welfare state are not problems that can be solved through the technicalities 
that control the level of public expenditures or tax revenues. This is, in the end, a matter of 
politics [8]. Therefore, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of fiscal sustainability, 
it should be conceptualized and measured in accordance with the economic structure and 
institutional capacity of the state.
Related to this, the research of Ostry et al. [56] and Ghosh et al. [57] is useful. Their research 
reflects the context in which public finance is embedded [58]. Changes in financial conditions 
do not always cause financial crises in the welfare state. We must consider the political, eco-
nomic, and social contexts that might lead to a financial crisis.2 They define the fiscal space as 
the gap between the debt limit and current debt level implied by the country’s historical fiscal 
adjustment for understanding fiscal sustainability like Figure 1 [56, 57].
First, the solid line represents the behavior of the primary balance as a function of debt. 
It reflects the nonlinear relationship between the primary balance and the public debt. 
Specifically, the primary balance shows little response to rising debt at very low levels of 
debt. Fiscal policy makers do react to changes in the level of public debt unless the public 
debt is fairly high [59], so the increase in the primary balance appears negligible. However, 
2The Bohn test, which draws implications from the manner in which fiscal policy has responded to increases in public 
debt, is also considered the context-embedded public finance, and it has two limitations [56]. That does not address 
the nonlinear relationships between primary balance and public debt and does not consider endogenous relationship 
between interest rates and public debt.
Figure 1. Determination of debt limit from Ostry et al. [56]: 8; Ghosh et al. [57]: F11.
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excessively high levels of debt may make it difficult to offset debt accumulation, because the 
marginal response of the primary balance to public debt is lower [60] and adjustment effort 
peters out as tax increases or spending cuts become politically infeasible [61].
Next, the dashed line shows the effective interest rate schedule, given the interest rate-GDP 
growth rate differential multiplied by the debt ratio. At low levels of debt, the interest rate is 
the risk-free rate, by assuming that output growth is independent of the public debt or the 
interest rate, so this schedule is simply a straight line with a slope determined by the risk-free 
interest rate-growth rate differential. When there is an unexpected economic shock, there is a 
stronger likelihood that public debt will accumulate, which means the debt reaches the debt 
limit, the interest rate is rapidly increased because of risk premiums. In this case, creditors 
may be reluctant to buy public bonds because of concerns about the potential for the country 
to declare bankruptcy. To secure public finances, countries should be willing to raise the inter-
est rate through the application of risk premiums because of the increased default risk. This is 
represented by the solid rising curve between d̂̂ and d¯.
Between these two lines, there are several intersections. The lower intersection (d∗) defines the 
conditional stable point. There is positive relationship between the primary balance and the 
public debt, so if a shock raises the debt level above this point, then the primary balance in 
subsequent periods will offset the higher interest payments and the debt ratio returns to its 
long-run average. However, the upper intersection (d¯) cannot guarantee fiscal sustainability. 
If the debt exceeds this point, then it will rise forever, because the primary surplus will never 
be enough to offset the growing debt. This point represents the public debt limit, which is the 
critical point of debt led by the historical fiscal response without special action of the govern-
ment [56]. If there is no fiscal space and a debt limit, current fiscal stance does not take the 
ability to afford the debt burden. That is, country is not always facing a fiscal crisis, but it is 
difficult to ensure the fiscal sustainability unless significant change of current fiscal stance [56].
At this point, in this study, I examine fiscal sustainability in the welfare state by calculating the fis-
cal space of the welfare state like Ostry et al. [56] and Ghosh et al. [57]. However, I have included 
some additional considerations for measuring fiscal sustainability in the welfare state. First, I 
select variables to estimate the fiscal reaction function based on theory and previous studies. I 
excluded some similar variables (openness, inflation, oil prices, and nonoil commodity prices) 
and replaced them with more appropriate variables to avoid multicollinearity problems. In addi-
tion, I include public welfare spending instead of total public expenditure in examining the fiscal 
sustainability of the welfare state. Second, the interest rate is estimated by the vector autoregres-
sive (VAR 1) model based on Polito and Wickens [62, 63] to avoid the problems caused by arbi-
trary regulations as well as to reflect the endogenous relationship between debt and interest rate.
2.2.2. Determinants of fiscal sustainability of welfare states
Although the composition of the national finance has recently been pointed out as a determi-
nant of fiscal sustainability [6, 27], empirical research has lacked reflection them. In the previ-
ous study, total public spending and total tax burden level were mostly considered, focusing 
on identifying whether spending cutoff strategies and tax expansion strategies are more effec-
tive to ensure fiscal sustainability [56, 64]. It is true that those were difficult to suggest specific 
policy measures to enhance the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. Related to this, this 
study focuses on tax structure as a determinant of fiscal sustainability of welfare state.
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Basically, tax is a representative resource mobilization tool of the advanced welfare state. 
Therefore, the level of tax burden in terms of public revenue should be discussed in relation 
to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. In order to cover welfare expenditures, a cer-
tain level of tax burden must be guaranteed, but if the tax burden is too high, it is not easy to 
increase the burden level [19, 65]. There are many reasons for the increase in incentives for tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. On the other hand, too low level of tax burden can also negatively 
impact fiscal sustainability. This is because there is a high possibility that sufficient financial 
resources are not available for public expenditure.
In addition, the structural characteristics of tax, especially tax equity, should be considered as the 
main factors. Because taxation inevitably violates the private ownership of a member, a lack of 
reasonable grounds for who owes taxes can lead to tax resistance and promote social conflict and 
division. Therefore, taxes must be imposed on the basis of justifiable grounds to secure political 
support for welfare states [12]. Indeed, the views on the taxation of the public are determined not 
by the level of burden but by the fairness of burden [27, 66]. The fairness of taxation can be defined 
as the principle of the ability to pay and the benefit principle. The former is the view that mem-
bers of society are obliged to pay taxes regardless of the benefits they receive from the state as a 
member of the state. Accordingly, it is fair and desirable to pay taxes according to the ability to 
pay or to charge. On the other hand, the principle of benefit attaches importance to the exchange 
of benefits from tax and public goods, with the view that the taxpayer will pay the benefits of the 
provision of national services. In other words, it is fair to pay fair compensation for benefits.
Tax on the basis of each principle can have a different impact on the fiscal sustainability of a 
welfare state. First, in relation to the principle of ability to pay, direct taxation with a high tax 
rate can have a negative impact on economic growth by lowering incentives for labor and high 
tax evasion in the high-income class. On the basis of this, the enhancement of tax progressivity 
may hinder the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. However, it is also true that people are 
not always opposed to high-level taxation [67]. In addition, the Progressive Tax System can be 
designed to lower income inequality by designing the higher income group to pay a higher tax 
burden than the low-income group, thus contributing to social sustainability by preventing 
conflicts between taxpayers and beneficiaries due to worsening income distribution.
Meanwhile, the horizontal equity, one part of ability to pay, is also considered. Related to 
this, the possibility of taxation of capital and property is lowered due to the intensification of 
tax competition caused by globalization [68], and advanced welfare countries have shown a 
tendency to rely on a consumption tax rather than an income tax. Unlike in the past, the gap 
between the labor and the capital is significantly increasing, while the gap between the labor 
and the consumption is significantly decreasing. Recalling that vertical equity and horizontal 
equity are inseparable, and that inequity on one side is not offset by the achievement of equity 
through other principles [69], the inhibition of confidence that the tax burden is fairly distrib-
uted can make it difficult and may not only lead to a lack of financial resources to support the 
welfare state, but also to difficulties in obtaining political support. Thus, the widening gap 
between tax sources have a negative effect on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state as 
the level of equity is raised to the level of horizontal equity.
On the other hand, social security contributions and the contributions of the private sector 
are closely related to the principle of benefit. This is mainly used for specific social security 
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purposes so that it can maintain actuarial soundness and positively affect the fiscal sustain-
ability of the welfare state. In addition, political support will likely be high because it pays for 
the benefits that will come in the future [70]. Particularly in the case of contributions by the 
private sector, the loyalty of the contributors may be higher because it is more exclusive than 
the social security tax. However, this may lead to the undesirable exclusion of low-income 
people, which may hinder social and political sustainability. In this sense, it is possible that 
the social security system is limited to a small number of full-time workers and the corpora-
tion, so it leads to unfairness in the tax burden and severe tax resistance [71–73].
As mentioned above, each aspect of equity in the tax structure may have different impacts 
on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. In addition, the tax structure may change the 
impact of welfare expenditures on the fiscal sustainability of a welfare state. First, increasing 
welfare expenditures worsens the nation’s financial condition. However, if the level of wel-
fare spending is combined with a sufficient level of tax burden and a fair tax burden, then the 
negative impact of welfare expenditures may decrease [61, 74]. Thus, we must examine the 
moderating effects of tax structure on the impact of welfare expenditures and fiscal sustain-
ability, as well as the direct effects of tax structure on fiscal sustainability.
3. Research method
3.1. Analysis target and timing
The analysis of national finances should incorporate careful selection of the analysis target 
because analysis results may be different depending on which country is analyzed. Because, 
there is a huge gap between the high- and low-income countries’ socioeconomic development 
levels, especially in terms of the level of public expenditures, the taxation capacity, and the 
tax structure, so it is necessary to analyze the two groups separately. This chapter analyses the 
17 OECD countries, and considering the possibility of data access and the analysis of OECD 
major countries is reasonable in order to draw implications in the establishment of a welfare 
state with a financial balance. Specifically, the analysis includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Next, this chapter analyzes the fiscal sustainability of welfare states over the course of 28 years, 
from 1986 to 2013, while the independent variables, including tax structure and welfare expen-
ditures, are based on the period from 1985 to 2012, lagged term (t − 1), considering temporal 
precedence as a requirement for causality.3 Those OECD countries have undergone a series of 
welfare and tax reforms to alleviate the burden of national financing, having experienced severe 
economic downturns during the mid to late 1970s. Since the effects of reform are not immediately 
3This is based on the fact that the expenditures for that year are carried out in accordance with the previous year’s budget 
plan. The analysis is also conducted by adding value from 5 years prior to reflect the medium-term fiscal plan in high-
income countries as a 5-year plan. In the determinants of fiscal sustainability of the welfare state, the correlation between 
welfare expenditures and fiscal capacity may not be reflected within a short time frame. In particular, the impact of fiscal 
capacity on welfare expenditures is likely to be seen in the medium term, because in high-income countries, the level of 
public expenditures is usually determined through the medium- and long-term financial management of the country.
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apparent, but, rather, come after a certain period of time, this study has limited its analysis to late 
1980s, specifically since 1986 (independent variables since 1985). In addition, until early 1990s, 
most advanced welfare states demonstrated a relatively moderate increase in national debt. 
However, since mid-1990s, sovereign debt has soared, and concerns about the national debt have 
become more widespread since the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, it is possible to derive 
timely policy implications for ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state by analyzing 
the period when the national debt had soared and a widespread financial crisis occurred.
3.2. Method of analysis
This study constructs simultaneous equations to control the inverse causal relationship 
between welfare expenditures and fiscal sustainability by examining the effects of tax struc-
ture on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. Existing studies have focused on the 
impact of fiscal spending on fiscal soundness [55, 64]. It is not only welfare expenditures that 
affect national finances, but also the government’s fiscal capacity for welfare expenditures, 
which will be limited if finances are not sufficient in the long term. In other words, the finan-
cial condition of the state also affects welfare expenditures. If the effect of financial power on 
welfare expenditures is not reflected in the analytical model, there is a possibility that the 
estimation will be biased due to the endogeneity problem. In this study, the simultaneous 
equations model is set and analyzed. Thus, this study constructs a simultaneous equations 
model with two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the fiscal sustainability 
of the welfare state and is measured by the fiscal space of each year on each welfare state. The 
second dependent variable is the level of public social welfare expenditures, which reflects 
public welfare efforts or the level of benefits enjoyed by the public.
Model estimations are adopted as a three-step least-squares method devised by Zellner and 
Theil [75]. This is a combination of the two-step least-squares method and the seemingly 
unrelated regression model, and all of the equations comprising the simultaneous equations 
are simultaneously estimated so that the correlation between the error terms of each equation 
is reflected in the analysis [75]. Using this method, we can derive the coincidental estima-
tor from the simultaneous equations model and find a more efficient estimator than the one 
using the two-step least-squares method. Additional consideration utilizing national panel 
data is also considered for treating the endogeneity problem caused by non-modeled factors 
in the use of national panel data, which may lead to bias in statistical estimation. Specifically, 
a fixed-effects model with national dummy variables is constructed and analyzed in each 
equation of simultaneous equations. Additionally, the financial capacity of advanced welfare 
states has undergone structural changes since late 2000s [76], so the equations analyzed reflect 
the effect of timing changes, including year dummy (before 2008 and after then) variables.
3.3. Operational definition of variables
3.3.1. Dependent variables
The fiscal sustainability of the welfare state, the first dependent variable, is measured as fiscal 
space, which can be specified by the gap between current debt levels and debt limits accord-
ing to Ostry et al.’s [56] and Ghosh et al.’s [57] method of calculating. Fiscal space is not 
merely a source of funds to meet the current welfare needs of the public. Rather, it plays 
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an important role in resource mobilization to cover future spending, as well as cushioning 
against unexpected risks [77, 78]. In other words, the issue of fiscal space is a question of 
whether countries can finance their obligations, including social security, without sacrificing 
economic growth and stability based on fiscal sustainability [5, 50]. Therefore, fiscal space can 
be a useful tool in examining the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.
In order to derive the abovementioned fiscal space as shown in Figure 1, it is necessary to esti-
mate the fiscal reaction function and select the appropriate gap between the interest rate and 
the growth rate [57]. This is because it is necessary to determine the debt limit of each country 
on the basis of the intersection of the estimated base on the fiscal reaction function and the 
interest repayment schedule. This study estimates the fiscal reaction function through pooled 
time series analysis and uses a vector autoregressive model for estimation to establish the gap 
between the appropriate interest rate and the growth rate. The description of variables used 
for estimating the fiscal reaction function is shown in Table 1.4
Next, one of the most important points to be considered in determining the national debt 
limit, along with the estimation of the fiscal reaction function, is how to define the long-term 
interest rate [56].5 This study estimates the interest rate through vector autoregulation (VAR), 
similar to the works of Polito and Wickens [62, 63]. This is because it not only avoids arbi-
trary problems, but also reflects the endogenous relationship between the interest rate and 
the national debt level (Table 2). In this study, the autoregressive model is used to model 
the endogenous relationship between the interest rate and the national debt, adding govern-
ment revenue, government spending, debt, the economic growth rate, the inflation rate, and 
short- and long-term interest rates [62, 63]. The gap between these estimates and the average 
real growth rates of the countries from 1985 to 2013 are used to calculate the debt limit and 
determine fiscal space based on this. The contents and data sources of the variables used for 
estimating the fiscal reaction function are shown in Table 3.
The second dependent variable is public welfare expenditures. This is the level of public (gen-
eral government) social welfare spending that reflects public welfare efforts or the level of 
benefits enjoyed by the public. Total public welfare expenditures divided by the gross domes-
tic product is used to control differences in the welfare expenditure level according to the 
level of economic scale by country.
4The dependent variable is the primary balance, and the independent variables are the financial factors (national debt, 
public welfare expenditures, output gap, inflation rate), the economic structural factors (unemployment rate, service 
industry ratio, portion of involuntary part-time work, economic openness, aging rate, future old age portion), and po-
litical and financial institutional factors (election, change of ideology, mandatory political system, concentration index, 
fiscal rule index). In this study, it is based on the works of Ostry et al. [56] and Ghosh et al. [57], but some variables are 
excluded in consideration of multicollinearity.
5Ostry et al. [56] determined long-term interest rates in two ways. The first assumes that the observed interest rate itself 
reflects the perceived probability of bankruptcy of a country, so the current market rate is used as the long-term interest 
rate. In this case, it is possible to overestimate the maximum value of sustainable debt by overlooking the fact that the 
interest rate rises as the debt level approaches its limit, and the risk of bankruptcy increases. An alternative method of 
overcoming this limitation is to use the interest rate, which is calculated by taking into account the endogenous rela-
tionship between debt levels and interest rates. Specifically, they used the calculated interest rate, assuming a recovery 
rate of 90% when bankruptcy occurred. Alternative methods which they used help to accurately estimate fiscal space 
by reflecting endogenous relationships between interest rates and macroeconomic variables. However, the abovemen-
tioned study does not provide a clear basis for assumptions used in interest rate estimation. Therefore, it is not free of 
the problems caused by an arbitrary definition of the recovery rate [80]. In order to overcome these limitations, this study 
uses the estimates through VAR.
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Categories Definition Sources
Dependent variable Primary balance Government net borrowing or 
net lending excluding interest 
payments on consolidated 
government liabilities/nominal 
GDP
OECD Economic Outlook
OECD Social Expenditures 
database
Independent 
variables
Finance Lagged debt General government debt/
nominal GDP
Output gap Difference between actual and 
potential (calculated using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter) real GDP
Welfare expenditures Public social expenditures
Inflation △CPI
t
/CPI
t−1
Economic 
structure
Unemployment (unemployed/labor force 
population) × 100
OECD Employment and 
Labor Market Statistics 
databaseService industry (Workers in service industry/
total employment) × 100
Part-time worker (Non-voluntary part-
time workers/labor force 
population) × 100
Self-employed (Self-employed/labor force 
population) × 100
Capital openness Chinn-Ito index Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN)
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/
Chinn-Ito_website.htm
Age dependency (People over age 65/total 
population) × 100
OECD Employment and 
Labor Market Statistics 
databaseFuture dependency (People over age 65/population of 
ages 15–64) × 100, years ahead
Political 
and fiscal 
systems
Election Dummy variable of election 
(election: 1 no election: 0)
Comparative political 
dataset/IMF fiscal rules 
databasePolitical stability Ideological differences between 
current and former Cabinet
Majority system Majority system:1; others: 0
Centralization Index of federalism, the strength 
of the bicameral legislature, 
effective number of parties, and 
the independence of the financial 
management organization
Fiscal rule Index of introduction of fiscal 
rules, legislative base of rules, 
existence of the multiyear 
spending limit, exception and 
financial monitoring system
Table 1. Variables for estimating the fiscal reaction function.
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3.3.2. Independent variables
Tax structure, a major independent variable, is divided between the ability to pay principle 
and the benefit principle. The former is divided into horizontal equity and vertical equity. In 
the following section, the operation of each principle is described in detail.
Categories Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum maximum
Dependent 
variable
Primary balance 0.249 3.693 −10.505 15.786
Independent 
variables
Finance Lagged debt 71.681 28.763 16.079 166.190
Output gap −0.049 2.622 −13.851 9.579
Welfare expenditures 22.763 4.857 10.565 35.517
Inflation 2.935 2.755 −0.900 23.015
Economic 
structure
Unemployment 7.636 3.940 0.457 24.885
Service industry 2.679 0.793 1.232 5.384
Part-time worker 3.071 1.649 0.295 9.714
Self-employed 15.987 9.116 6.536 50.708
Capital openness 1.929 0.908 −1.188 2.390
Age dependency 15.466 2.015 10.255 21.080
Future dependency 31.238 5.987 18.478 51.991
Political and 
fiscal systems
Election 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000
Political stability 0.353 0.772 0.000 3.000
Majority system 0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000
Centralization 0.672 0.115 0.370 1.000
Fiscal rule 0.419 0.172 0.242 0.908
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables for estimating fiscal reaction function.
Variables Definition Sources
Public debt General government public debt as a percentage of GDP OECD Economic Outlook  
No. 97 (Edition 2015/1)
Government revenue Total government revenue as a percentage of GDP
Government 
expenditure
Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Output gap Difference between actual GDP and potential GDP
Inflation The annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services
Long-term interest rate Interest rate of government bonds maturing in 10 years
Short-term interest rate Interest rate which is money market rate
Note: Each variable in the estimated variables is included from t−1 to t−n. t = 1, …, 27.
Table 3. Variables for estimating long-term interest rate.
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3.3.2.1. Measurement of horizontal equity
Horizontal equity identifies the tax rate gaps between labor and assets and labor and consump-
tion, which are major tax sources because guaranteeing horizontal equity means that equity is 
ensured among the tax bases [69]. In particular, despite the weakening of the tax base, labor 
taxation is the most basic tax in all countries, so horizontal equity is defined based on the labor 
tax. Specifically, each tax rate on the labor, capital, and consumption of households is derived, 
and the tax rate differences between labor and capital taxation and labor and consumption tax 
are calculated based on the method proposed by Macdaniel [79].6 According to the study, the 
government’s tax revenue is divided into labor tax, capital tax, private consumption tax, and 
private investment tax. Moreover, the average tax rate of each tax base is calculated by divid-
ing each tax revenue from each source into the corresponding tax sources [79].
3.3.2.2. Measurement of vertical equity
Vertical equity, one aspect of the ability to pay principle, is measured by the relative ratio of 
the marginal tax rate among income groups. In the comparison of tax progressivity among 
countries, a structural approach has been utilized to compare statutory tax rates, as well as 
comparisons within specific income groups. In this study, the structural approach is used 
for cross-country comparisons, although it is recognized as a valid criticism that it is difficult 
to reflect differences in taxable income using this [84, 85]. This study reflects the differences 
between progressivity in the low-income class (67% of the average wage and the average 
wage) and progressivity in the high-income class (comparison between the average wage and 
the average wage of 167%) considering data accessibility. In addition, this study measures the 
actual burden level, excluding benefits by subtracting the transfer of cash so as to more accu-
rately measure the progressivity. For the values which are calculated as mentioned above, the 
higher the value, the stronger the progressivity, and the lower the value, the more regressive 
it is. This approach has the advantage of reflecting the degree of progressivity. The marginal 
tax rate data among the income groups for estimates of progressivity were used by Nickell 
[86] and the OECD Taxing Wages Database. That database provides marginal tax rates for 
OECD countries between 1960 and 2004. On the basis of this, the OECD has calculated the 
marginal tax rates of each country since 2000, and this study combines both datasets.
3.3.2.3. Measurement of the benefit principle
The benefit principle is specified by the share of social security contributions in GDP [73]. 
The social security contribution is a welfare state resource that is provided through contribu-
tions made by both employers and employees. This is a fixed use, and it is based on a burden 
corresponding to the benefits, so it is related to the benefit principle [73]. In addition, the 
proportion of private contributions to welfare resources supplements the benefit principle. 
6The reason for using this method is as follows. First, it uses only one dataset, OECD national accounts, so it resolves the 
problem of differences in reflection times in the figures according to the differences in accounting methods by using two 
datasets, OECD national accounts and revenue statistics, similar to the existing studies of Mendoza et al. [81] and Carey 
and Rabesona [82, 83]. Second, this method overcomes the overestimation of consumption tax, one of the limitations of 
existing methods caused when consumption and investment taxes are not separated. In this method, the consumption 
tax remains separate from taxation on investments so that it can be more accurately measured.
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Categories Variables Definition Sources
Equation. 1 Dependent 
variable
Fiscal sustainability Fiscal space OECD 
National 
account
Independent 
variables
Welfare expenditures Total public welfare expenditures/
nominal GDP
OECD 
Social 
Expenditure 
Statistics
Tax burden Total tax revenue/nominal GDP OECD Tax 
Dataset
Ability to pay 
principle
Horizontal 
equity
Gap between effective tax rate on 
labor and capital
OECD 
National 
accountGap between effective tax rate on 
labor and consumption
Vertical equity ((1 − marginal tax rate of average 
wage 67%)/(1 − marginal tax rate 
of average wage 100%)) − 1
Nickell [86]
OECD Tax 
Dataset
((1 − marginal tax rate of average 
wage 100%)/(1 − marginal tax rate 
of average wage 167%)) − 1
Benefit principle Social security contribution/
nominal GDP
OECD 
Revenue 
Statistics: 
financing 
of social 
security 
benefits
Mandatory private contribution/
total social security revenue
Equation 2 Dependent 
variable
Welfare expenditures Total public welfare expenditures/
nominal GDP
OECD 
Social 
Expenditure 
Dataset
Independent 
variables
Fiscal sustainability Fiscal space OECD 
National 
account
Generosity of public pension Index of public pension 
considering the replacement rate, 
qualifications, scope or coverage, 
and waiting period
Scruggs 
et al. [88]
CWED2
Generosity of public 
unemployment insurance
Index of unemployment 
insurance considering the 
replacement rate, qualifications, 
scope or coverage, and waiting 
period
Generosity of sickness insurance Index of sickness insurance 
considering the replacement rate, 
qualifications, scope or coverage, 
and waiting period
Table 4. Variables for estimating determinants of fiscal sustainability of welfare state.
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Private contributions are generally designed to benefit contributors and are not reflected in 
government finances, but they can have a positive impact on the maintenance of public wel-
fare programs. Thus, this study uses the share of social security contributions and the share of 
private contributions as proxies of the benefit principle.
3.3.2.4. Measurement of the generosity of the welfare system
To identify the simultaneous equations model, the second equation, which has welfare expen-
ditures as a dependent variable, requires additional exogenous variables, excluding the fiscal 
sustainability variable with endogeneity.7 In this study, it is possible to identify the model 
by introducing the generosity of the public pension, unemployment insurance, and disease 
insurance of the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset 2 (CWED2). These variables are 
calculated by taking into account the replacement rate, qualifications, scope or coverage, and 
waiting period [87, 88] (Table 4).
4. Determinants of fiscal sustainability in welfare state
In the first equation, where fiscal space as the proxy of fiscal sustainability is a dependent 
variable, welfare expenditures have a negative impact on the fiscal sustainability of the wel-
fare state at a statistically significant level. Moreover, although the magnitude of the negative 
impact of welfare spending in the lagged term is somewhat smaller, the increase in welfare 
spending in the medium term tends to lower fiscal space even further. On the other hand, 
the results of the second equation with welfare expenditures as a dependent variable demon-
strate that welfare expenditures increase as the fiscal space increases at a statistically signifi-
cant level in the medium-to-long term. This supports the argument that it is essential to secure 
fiscal space for the continuation of the welfare state in the long term [5].
If we look only at the results of the first equation, it may be argued that public welfare spend-
ing must be reduced, because welfare spending lowers the nation’s fiscal space. However, 
considering the political resistance that may be caused by the reduction of welfare expendi-
tures, it is necessary to examine how financial resources can positively influence fiscal sustain-
ability. At first, increase of tax revenue may offset the negative impact of welfare expenditures 
on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state as well as positively affect the fiscal sustain-
ability of the welfare state (Table 5).
It is noted that the perception of tax burden is not absolutely influenced by the level of the 
burden, but, rather, it is influenced by equity [27, 66]. This study examines the level of tax bur-
den and the taxation specified by the fairness principle and analyzes the effects of taxation on 
the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. In addition, the impact of welfare expenditures on 
fiscal sustainability may change according to tax structure characteristics. Even if increases in 
welfare expenditures negatively affect national finances, the public may be willing to accept 
7In the process of estimating the fiscal space of the welfare state not only are the demand factors reflected, which are 
likely to drive welfare expenditures. In this situation, if these variables included to estimate fiscal sustainability are used, 
there is the possibility that the endogeneity problem will occur. Therefore, it is necessary to include variables with high 
relevance to welfare expenditures while minimizing the problem of endogeneity.
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Dependent 
variables
Independent variables Model 1 Model 1
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Fiscal sustainability 
Equation 1
Welfare expenditure (t − 1) −4.32 0.35*** −3.74 0.34***
Welfare expenditure (t − 5) −1.79 0.39***
Tax burden 1.01 0.50* 1.84 0.52***
Gap between effective tax 
rate on labor and capital
1.64 2.23 −2.66 4.07
Gap between effective 
tax rate on labor and 
consumption
−83.60 22.70*** −131.0 22.53***
Progressivity (low income 
group)
−23.78 8.80** −31.50 9.79**
Progressivity (high income 
group)
4.37 7.72 −0.18 7.51
Social security contribution 3.80 1.21** 4.75 1.17***
Mandatory private 
contribution
0.97 0.22*** 0.99 0.21***
Welfare expenditures * tax 
burden
0.24 0.05***
Welfare expenditures * gap 
between effective tax rate on 
labor and capital
−4.32 3.50
Welfare expenditures * gap 
between effective tax rate on 
labor and consumption
−11.85 3.97**
Welfare expenditures * 
progressivity (low income 
group)
3.36 2.04
Welfare expenditures * 
progressivity (high income 
group)
−0.77 1.56
Welfare expenditures * social 
security contribution
0.29 0.12*
Welfare expenditures *  
mandatory private 
contribution
0.08 0.04*
Constant term 139.13 24.05*** 141.22 23.26***
Welfare 
expenditures 
Equation 2
Fiscal sustainability (t − 1) −0.07 0.01*** −0.07 0.01***
Fiscal sustainability (t − 5) 0.05 0.01*** 0.05 0.01***
Generosity of public pension 0.44 0.16** 0.40 0.16*
Generosity of public 
unemployment insurance
0.42 0.16* 0.42 0.17*
Generosity of sickness 
insurance
0.65 0.24** 0.65 0.24**
Constant term 11.67 2.51*** 11.66 2.52***
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the financial burden in the long run by recognizing the tax burden differently, considering the 
benefits of the fiscal expenditure and the fairness of the tax burden [61, 74]. For example, a fair 
tax burden may offset the negative effects of welfare spending and may also have a positive 
impact on fiscal sustainability. For this reason, this study focuses on the moderating effect of 
the tax structure on the relationship between welfare expenditures and fiscal sustainability, as 
well as the direct effect of the tax structure on fiscal sustainability.
Specifically, the gap in the tax base, especially the gap between labor taxation and consump-
tion taxation, hinders the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state in terms of horizontal 
equity. In addition, the negative effect of welfare expenditures on fiscal sustainability tends to 
become larger as the gap between labor and consumption increases. On the other hand, the 
direct effect of the gap between labor and capital taxation does not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect. Although the impact of the gap between labor and capital taxation on fiscal sus-
tainability is not statistically significant, the negative effects of welfare expenditures on fiscal 
sustainability intensify when tax equity is not guaranteed. In other words, if the tax burden 
is not distributed fairly among the tax base (labor, capital, and consumption), it is difficult to 
guarantee the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.
Second, the effect of the level of vertical equity on the fiscal capacity of the welfare state is 
mixed. The increase of the progression in low-income groups has a statistically significant neg-
ative impact on fiscal capacity, while the increase of progressivity in the high-income group is 
not statistically significant, although it demonstrates a positive impact. In addition, the latter 
also alleviates the negative impact of welfare expenditures at a statistically significant level. 
Related to this, it is worth noting that severe income tax burdens on low-income households 
may have a negative impact on improvements to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.
It is important to point out the relationships between the ability to pay principle and fiscal 
sustainability of the welfare state. This is also associated with mixed analysis results in ver-
tical equity. The golden age of the welfare state, from 1930 to 1960, had been supported by 
the ability to pay principle. As the principle of social justice based on equity was expanded, 
demand for redistribution expanded, and income tax assumed stronger progressive charac-
teristics. This is due to the fact that in the reality of social ills caused by the monopoly of the 
capital growth process, the state faithfully tries to tame the working class and to correct the 
Dependent 
variables
Independent variables Model 1 Model 1
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Number of obs Equation 1 304 303
Equation 2 304 303
F value Equation 1 792.60*** 779.06***
Equation 2 122.71*** 123.37***
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
†p < 0.1.
Table 5. Determinants of fiscal sustainability on welfare state.
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unfairness of disparity. In this way, it is difficult to say the more progressive taxation makes 
always the more tax avoidance of the high-income class [67].
However, if progressive tax burdens are recognized to be unfair, their impact may vary, 
because the excessive burden can foster tax evasion [67]. As it is actually known, in 1970s, 
taxes were raised faster than income, political rebellion became fierce, and most high-income 
countries stopped raising income taxes to prevent capital from being exported abroad (busi-
nesses) and the emigration of productive workers. The problem is that lowering the tax 
burden on capital raises the risk of hindering horizontal equity with labor taxation and the 
reduction of tax progressivity [68]. In this manner, if the ability to pay principle is not guar-
anteed, it is possible to both diminish tax progressiveness and increase the possibility of tax 
avoidance.
This is because vertical equity and horizontal equity are inseparable. Both principles have 
goals that seek to achieve, and one principle cannot replace the other. In other words, inequal-
ities caused by each equity principle are not offset by the achievement of equity through 
other equity improvements, so that each principle must be resolved directly to the unfairness 
of the respective side [69]. When vertical equity does not guarantee tax breaks for capital 
(businesses) and high-income earners, the fair burden condition may be violated, which will 
enhance the tax resistance of the people and promote tax evasion, even if horizontal equity is 
raised. Therefore, fairness of the burden according to the ability to pay can be realized when 
horizontal equity and vertical equity realize their respective goals. Taxation will then work to 
contribute positively to fiscal sustainability.
On the other hand, in terms of the benefit principle, the increase of social security contribu-
tions has a positive effect on the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state and also has the effect 
of offsetting the negative impact of welfare expenditures on fiscal sustainability. In addition, 
the increase of mandatory private contributions positively affects fiscal sustainability, even 
though this is not included in the government’s finances. These public finance sources related 
to the benefit principle carry high political acceptability, because it is easy to secure politi-
cal support for the burden in terms of direct benefit to the person [89]. In addition, private 
mandatory contributions can alleviate the fiscal burden of a country without public welfare 
efforts. Therefore, in order to secure the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state, it appears 
necessary to diversify the financial structure of the welfare state by making appropriate use 
of both social security contributions and private contributions.
5. Conclusion
This study identifies determinants of fiscal sustainability of the welfare state by focusing 
on tax structure. As confirmed by the results of the study, it is essential to secure financial 
resources to maintain the welfare state. In the short term, fiscal space may not drive the expan-
sion of welfare expenditures, but it nonetheless leads to this in the medium-to-long term. The 
problem is that an increase in welfare spending may worsen fiscal sustainability, and it is 
not always an appropriate solution to reduce welfare expenditures in order to increase fiscal 
space, which is in keeping with the arguments of welfare state opponents. It is impossible 
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to cut welfare spending thoughtlessly because many social problems should be addressed 
through collaborative social efforts, and it is also not a suitable alternative to increase welfare 
spending indefinitely while worsening fiscal space because this may over time dismantle the 
financial base of the welfare state. It is therefore important to seek ways to maintain welfare 
spending while ensuring fiscal sustainability.
As can be seen from the analysis results, the level of tax burden is an important aspect of fiscal 
sustainability in the welfare state. Tax revenue is the funded basis for maintaining the welfare 
state, so increasing tax compliance to offset the negative impact of increasing welfare spend-
ing will promote social cohesion. However, the national financial effort to maintain the wel-
fare represents more than collecting additional taxes. The excessive burden does not always 
have a positive impact on fiscal sustainability, and it is not always possible for a country to 
collect more tax revenues to expand welfare. Thus, the most important aspect of total tax rev-
enue that should be considered is the manner in which tax revenue is raised because depend-
ing on which method is adopted, the impact of taxation on the sustainability of economic, 
political, and social dimensions varies. As indicated in this study, it appears that securing tax 
fairness contributes to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. The following aspects of 
the tax structure may positively contribute to fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.
First, in terms of the ability to pay principle, the achievement of equity between the tax base and 
improvements in progressivity may play a positive role in the fiscal sustainability of the welfare 
state. It appears obvious that the reduction of the gap between labor taxation and consumption 
taxation plays a significantly positive role in ensuring fiscal sustainability. Consumption tax 
may play a more positive role than taxation on labor in terms of social and political sustainabil-
ity, as well as economic sustainability. In fact, advanced welfare countries have been interested 
in indirect taxation, including consumption tax, for which it is easy to secure public revenues 
in order to overcome the financial crisis, while it is difficult to secure tax revenue from direct 
taxes such as income tax and corporation tax, which are sensitive to economic changes [90–93]. 
In addition, it can contribute to the achievement of intergenerational equity by relieving elderly 
households, which are often more heavily burdened [94]. Moreover, in the event that the labor 
taxation base is broken due to labor market dualization and declining employment rates, a 
consumption tax based on universal solidarity is one way to secure a wide tax base.
However, if we rely only upon the expansion of the consumption tax, it can place an excessive 
burden on the low-income class due to the regressive tax burden. Therefore, it is necessary to 
ensure sufficient welfare benefits for low-income people, along with progressive taxation, in 
order to relax the regressive burden and to narrow the gap between the consumption tax and 
the labor tax. Specifically, improving vertical equity may also result in a positive contribution 
to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state and will secure the political legitimacy of the tax 
and mitigate the regressive burden that may result from the expansion of a consumption tax. 
In particular, it is worth noting that a progressive tax on high-income earners does not always 
cause tax evasion. For example, if the tax burden is in accordance with appropriate benefits 
that are provided by the state, a progressive tax increases tax compliance. Thus, broadening 
the tax base by means of the consumption tax must be done in a manner that allocates the 
fair burden to all citizens according to the ability to pay, which ultimately ensures the fiscal 
sustainability of the welfare state.
Taxes and Taxation Trends116
Finally, diversifying the financial base of the welfare state by combining the ability to pay 
principle and the benefit principle is advantageous to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare 
state. Raising social security contributions or private contributions also has a positive effect 
on fiscal sustainability according to these principles. However, public services through these 
sources are limited to a small number of regular employees, and this may cause labor tax 
resistance and the social exclusion of low-income or irregular workers, as well as unem-
ployed. Thus, it must be implemented by diversifying the funding base of the welfare state 
with a combination of the ability to pay principle and the benefit principle to maintain 
solidarity.
Author details
Ko Hyejin
Address all correspondence to: hjesquisse@gmail.com
Social Welfare Research Center, Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
References
[1] O'Connor J. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press; 1973
[2] Gough I. The Political Economy of the Welfare State. London: MacMillan Publishing 
Company; 1979
[3] Streeck W. Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. Verso: Brooklyn, 
NY; 2014
[4] Heller PS. Understanding Fiscal Space. IMF Policy Discussion Paper, no, 05/04 Ed. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund; 2005
[5] Harris E. Financing social protection floors: Considerations of fiscal space. International 
Social Security Review. 2013;66:111-143
[6] Alesina A, Giavazzi F. The austerity question: 'How?' is as important as 'how much? In: 
Corsetti G, editor. Austerity: Too Much of a Good Thing? Centre for Economic Policy 
Research. 2012. pp. 11-15
[7] Delong JB. The austerity question: 'How?' is as important as 'how much? In: Corsetti 
G, editor. Austerity: Too Much of a Good Thing? Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
2012. pp. 17-21
[8] Guy P. Fiscal Strains on the Welfare State: Causes and Consequeces. In: Levine CH, 
Rubin I, editors. Fiscal Stress and Public Policy. Everly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications; 
1980. pp. 23-47
How Does a Welfare State achieves Fiscal Sustainability? A Study of the Impact of Tax Equity
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72527
[9] Pierson P. Irresistible forces. Immovable objects: Post industrial welfare states confront 
permanent austerity. Journal of European Public Policy. 1998;4:539-560
[10] Kettl DF. Deficit Politics: The Search for Balance in American Politics. New York: Long-
man; 2003 ch3
[11] Swedberg R. The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press; 1991
[12] Martin W, Mehrotra AK, Prasad M. The Thunder of History: The Origins and 
Development of the New Fiscal Sociology. In: Martin W, Mehrotra AK, Prasad M, edi-
tors. The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009
[13] Agnello L, Castro V, Sousa RM. What determines the duration of a fiscal consolidation 
program? Journal of International Money and Finance. 2014;37:113-134
[14] Sakuragawa M, Karou H. Fiscal Sustainability in Japan. Japanese Economic Review. 
2010;61(4):517-537
[15] Park J. Determinants and consequences of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability [dis-
sertation]. Ann Arbor: The University of York (United Kingdom); 2012
[16] Aspromourgos T, Daniel R, White G. Public debt sustainability and alternative theories 
of interest. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 2010;34:433-447
[17] Chalk NA. The sustainability of bond-financed deficits: An overlapping generations 
approach. Journal of Monetary Economics. 2000;45:293-328
[18] Alesina A, Ardagna S, Perotti R, Schiantarelli F. Fiscal policy, profits, and investment. 
American Economic Review. 2002;92:571-589
[19] European Union, editor. Progress and Key Challenges in the Delivery of Adequate and 
Sustainable Pensions in Europe. European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs; 2010
[20] Greiner A. An endogenous growth model with public capital and sustainable govern-
ment debt. Japanese Economic Review. 2007;58:345-361
[21] Sims CA. The precarious fiscal foundations of EMU. DNB Staff Reports 1999, No. 34. ed. 
DNB; 1999
[22] Hauner D, Kumar M. Financial Globalization and Fiscal Performance in Emerging 
Markets. IMF Working Paper, No.05/212; 2005
[23] Drelichman M, Voth H-J. Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal 
repression. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2008;6:657-667
[24] Byrne JP, Fiess N, MacDonald R. The global dimension to fiscal sustainability. Journal of 
Macroeconomics. 2011;33:137-150
[25] Anand R, van Winibegen S. Inflacton and the Financing of Government Expenditure in 
Turkey. World Bank; 1987
[26] Sehovic D. The impact of the great recession on monetary and fiscal policy in developed 
market economics. Business. Systems Research. 2015;6(1):56-71
Taxes and Taxation Trends118
[27] Kaplanoglou G, Rapanos VT. Tax and trust: The fiscal crisis in Greece. South European 
Society and Politics. 2013;18(3):283-304
[28] Rose S. Institutions and fiscal sustainability. National Tax Journal. 2010;63:807-837
[29] Besley T, Case A. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competi-
tion. American Economic Review. 1995;85:25-45
[30] Carey JM, Niemi RG, Powell LW. The effects of term limits on state legislatures. Legis-
lative Studies Quarterly. 1998;23(2):271-300
[31] Carey JM, Niemi RG, Powell LW. The effects of term limits on state legislatures: A new 
survey of the 50 states. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2000;31(1):105-134
[32] Hallerberg, M. Strauch, R., von Hagen J. The design of Fiscal Rules and Forms of Gover-
nance in European Union Countries. European Central Bank Working Papers No. 419; 2004
[33] Hallerberg M, Strauch R, von Hagen J. The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance 
in European Union countries. European Journal of Political Economy. 2007;23(2):338-359
[34] Illera RM, Mulas-Granados C. What makes fiscal consolidations last? A survival analysis 
of budget cuts in Europe (1960-2004). Public Choice. 2008;134:147-161
[35] Miriam AG, Lucio P. Pork-barrel politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-94. American Journal of 
Political Science. 2008;52(2):268-289
[36] Crain M, Tollison R. Time inconsistency and fiscal policy: Empirical analysis of 
U.S. STATES. 1969-89. Journal of Public Economics. 1993;51:153-159
[37] Franzese, Robert J. The positive political economy of public debt: An empirical exami-
nation of the OECD postwar experience. 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1084130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1084130
[38] Persson T, Tabellin G. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Chur, Switzerland: 
Harwood Academic Publishers; 2000
[39] Bulow J, Rogoff K. Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review. 
1989;79(1):43-50
[40] Ko H. Empirical analysis of fiscal soundness and public social expenditure: A lesson for 
the future direction of the Korean welfare state. Asian Social Work and Policy Review. 
2014;8(1):16-33
[41] Kontopoulos Y, Perotti R. Fragmented Fiscal Policy. New York: Columbia University; 1997
[42] Kontopoulos Y, Perotti R. Government fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes: 
Evidence from the OECD countries. In: Poterba J, von Hagan J, editors. Fiscal Rules and 
Fiscal Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1999
[43] Volkerink B, Hann J. Fragmented government effects on fiscal policy, new evidence. 
Public Choice. 2001;109:221-242
[44] Perotti R, Kontopolos Y. Fragmented fiscal policy. Journal of Public Economics. 2002; 
86:191-222
[45] Ricciuti R. Political fragmentation and fiscal outcomes. Public Choice. 2004;118(3-4):365-388
How Does a Welfare State achieves Fiscal Sustainability? A Study of the Impact of Tax Equity
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72527
119
[46] Iverson T, Soskice D. Electoral institutions and the politics of coalition: Why some 
democracies redistribute more than other. American Political Science Review. 2006; 
100(2):165-180
[47] Iverson T, Soskice D. Distribution and redistribution: The shadow of the nineteen 
Century. World Politics. 2009;61(3):438-486
[48] Schmidt. The welfare state and the economy in periods of economic crisis: A com-
parative study of twenty-three OECD nations. European Journal of Political Research. 
1983;11:1-26
[49] Schick A. Budgeting for fiscal space. OECD Journal on Budgeting. 2009;9(2):1-18
[50] Marcel M. Budgeting for fiscal space and government performance beyond the great 
recession. OECD Journal on Budgeting. 2014;13(2):1-37
[51] Bohn H, Inman RP. Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the 
U.S. States. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5533; 1996
[52] Hallerberg M, von Hagen J. Electoral institutions, cabinets negotiations, and budget 
deficits within the European Union. In: Poterba J, von Hagen J, editors. Fiscal Rules and 
Fiscal Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1999
[53] Croce E, Hugo Juan-Ramon V. Assessing Fiscal Sustainability: A Cross Country 
Comparison. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund; 2003
[54] Richter C, Paparas D. How Reliable Are Budget Sustainability Tests A Case Study for 
Greece? International Network for Economic Research Working Paper; 2012
[55] Afonso A, Jalles JTA. Longer-run perspective on fiscal sustainability. Empirica. 2014; 
41:821-847
[56] Ostry JD, Ghosh A, Kim JI, Qureshi MS. Fiscal Space. Washington, DC: IMF Staff Position 
Note 10/11 September; 2010
[57] Ghosh AR, Kim JI, Mendoza EG, Ostry JD, Qureshi MS. Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal Space and 
Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No.16782.; 2013
[58] Campbell JL. The state and fiscal sociology. Annual Review of Sociology. 1993;19:163-185
[59] Bajo-Rubio O, Carmen D, Vicente E. Is the budget deficit sustainable when fiscal policy 
is nonlinear? Journal of Macroeconomics. 2006;28:596-608
[60] Mendoza EG, Ostry JD. International evidence on fiscal solvency: Is fiscal policy “respon-
sible”? Journal of Monetary Economics. 2008;55(6):1081-1093
[61] Ganghof S. Tax mixes and the size of the welfare state: Causal mechanisms and policy 
implications. Journal of European Social Policy. 2006;16:360-373
[62] Polito V, Wickens M. Assessing the fiscal stance in the European Union and the United 
States, 1970-2011. Economic Policy. 2011;68:601-629
Taxes and Taxation Trends120
[63] Polito V, Wickens MA. Model-based indicator of the fiscal stance. European Economic 
Review. 2012;56(3):526-551
[64] Jayawickrama A, Abeysinghe T. The experience of some OECD economies on tax 
smoothing. Applied Economics. 2013;45:2305-2313
[65] Glennerster H. Understanding the Finance of Welfare. The Policy Press: University of 
Bristor, UK; 2009
[66] Campbell JL. What American think of taxes. In: Martin IW, Mehrotra AK, Prasad M, 
editors. The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009
[67] Doerrenberg P, Peichl A. Progressive taxation and tax morale. Public Choice. 2013;155(3-
4):293-316. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9848-1
[68] Genschel P. Globalization amd the trasformation of the tax state. European Review. 
2005;13:53-71
[69] Kim S. Welfare State Changes and its Relationship with Tax Structures (in Korean) 
[Dissertation]. Seoul, Korea: Chung-Ang University; 2010
[70] Ide E, Steinmo S. The end of the strong state? On the evolution of Japanese tax policy. 
In: Martin W, Mehrotra AK, Prasad M, editors. The New Fiscal Sociology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 2009
[71] Ferrera M. The southern model of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European Social 
Policy. 1996;6(1):17-37
[72] Ferrera M. Welfare states and social nets in Southern Europe: An introduction. In: 
Maurizio, editor. Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe: Fighting Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. London and New York: Routledge; 2005. 
pp. 1-32
[73] Obinger H, Wagsshal U. Social expenditure and revenues. In: Castles FG, Leibfried S, 
Obinger H, Pierson C, editors. The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. London, UK, 
Oxford; 2010. pp. 333-352
[74] Steinmo S. Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to 
Financing the Modern State. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1993
[75] Zellner A, Theil H. Three-stage least squares, simultaneous estimation of simultaneous 
equations. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1962;30(1):54-78
[76] D’Erasmo P, Mendoza EG, Zhang J. What is a Sustainable Public Debt? NBER Working 
Paper, No. 21574; 2015
[77] Oritz I, Chaim J, Cummins M. Identifying Fiscal Space—Options for Social and Economic 
Development for Children and Poor Households in 184 Countries. UNICEF Social and 
Economics Policy Working Paper; 2011
How Does a Welfare State achieves Fiscal Sustainability? A Study of the Impact of Tax Equity
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72527
121
[78] Oritz I, Cummins M, Karunabethy K. Fiscal Space for Social Protection Options to 
Expand Social Investments 187 Countries. Geneva: International Labour Office; 2015
[79] Macdaniel C. Average Tax Rates on Consumption, Investment, Labor and Capital in the 
OECD 1950-2003. Arizona University; 2007
[80] Horne J. Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability. Washington DC: IMF Working Paper; 1991
[81] Mendoza E, Razin A, Tesar L. Effective tax rates in macroeconomics. Journal of Monetary 
Economics. 1994;34(3):197-323
[82] Carey D, Rabesona J. Tax ratios on labour and capital income and on consumption. 
OECD Economic Studies No. 35, 2002/2; 2002
[83] Carey, D., Rabesona, J. Tax rations on labour and capital income and on consumption. 
In: P. Sorensen, ediror. Measuring the Tax Burden on Capital and Labour. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press; 2004
[84] Attinas M-G, Checherita-Westphal C, Rieth M. Personal Income Tax Progressivity and 
Output Volatility Evidence from OECD Countries. European Working Paper. No. 1380; 2011
[85] Paturot D, Mellbye K, Brys B. Average Personal Income Tax Rate and Tax Wedge 
Progression in OECD Countries. OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 15, OECD 
Publishing; 2013
[86] Nickell W. The CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). London, UK: London 
School of Economics and Political Science; 2006
[87] Scruggs L. Social Welfare Generosity Scores in CWED 2: A Methodological Genealogy. 
CWED Working Paper Series. WP 01; 2014
[88] Scruggs L, Detlef J, Kati K. Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2 Codebook. 
Version 2014-03. University of Connecticut and University of Greifswald; 2014
[89] Lieberman ES. Taxation data as indicators of state-society relations: Possibilities and 
pitfalls in cross-national research. Studies in Comparative International Development. 
2002;36(4):89-115
[90] Kato J. Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State. Path Dependence and Policy Diffusion. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003
[91] Beramendi R, Rueda D. Social democracy constrained: Indirect taxation in industrial-
ized democracies. British Journal of Political Science. 2007;37:619-641
[92] Kneller R, Bleaney MF, Gemmel N. Fiscal policy and growth: Evidence from OECD 
Countrie. Journal of Public Economics. 1999;74:171-190
[93] Kneller R, Bleaney MF, Gemmel N. Testing the endogenous growth model: Public 
expenditure, taxation, and growth over the long run. Canadian Journal of Economics. 
2001;34(1):36-57
[94] Jones R, Fukawa SK. Achieving Fiscal Consolidation while Promoting Social Cohesion 
in Japan. OECD Publishing. Paris: OECD Economics Department Working Papers. NO. 
1262; 2015
Taxes and Taxation Trends122
